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Abstract
Simulated security assessments (a collective term used here for penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, and related
nomenclature) may need standardisation, but not in the commonly assumed manner of practical assessment method-
ologies. Instead, this study highlights market failures within the providing industry at the beginning and ending of
engagements, which has left clients receiving ambiguous and inconsistent services. It is here, at the prior and subsequent
phases of practical assessments that standardisation may serve the continuing professionalisation of the industry, and
provide benefits not only to clients, but the practitioners involved in the provision of these services. These findings
are based on the results of 54 stakeholder interviews with providers of services, clients, and coordinating bodies within
the industry. The paper culminates with a framework for future advancement of the ecosystem, which includes three
recommendations for standardisation.
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1. Introduction
In the presence of the seemingly inexorable increase
in cyber attacks, how should organisations best pursue
self-examination to accurately determine their resilience
to such threats? One approach has been through the in-
crease in services sold to these organisations that intend
to replicate the methodologies and techniques (technical
and social) of both internal and external malicious attack-
ers, which are branded using a complex, and often confus-
ing set of terminologies – something that we collectively
describe here as “simulated security assessments”. This
paper seeks to explore the context in which these services
are delivered, in order to determine best practices, and
opportunities for further advancement.
The collective terminology of simulated security assess-
ments uses the notion of simulation as it is established by
Such et al. [1] in their definition of information assur-
ance techniques. Simulation here is the practical imita-
tion of threat actors within real-world environments, as
opposed to the virtual alternative. Although the concept
bears a strong relationship to non-contractual vulnerabil-
ity research and its formally crowdsourced and contrac-
tual counterpart (e.g., bug bounty programs), the work
presented within this paper is primarily concerned with
contractual services procured from third party organisa-
tions.
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Examples of such simulated security assessments in-
clude red team exercises, penetration tests, social engineer-
ing, and vulnerability scans. In practice, each of these ser-
vices that can constitute a simulated security assessment
has subtle differences, which are defined here for further
context within this paper. The core feature of a vulnera-
bility scan is its use of automatic tools; however, the use
of automatic tools should arguably be followed up at min-
imum with a cursory manual review (e.g., false positive
and negative verification), but at what level of analysis
does manual review become a vulnerability assessment?
Furthermore, how much manual review is required before
an engagement can be considered a penetration test, or
is such a label defined by the use of exploitation? This
distinction is perhaps most notable and has been the most
controversial within the security community. Labellings
such as “IT Health Check” add a further dimension to this
conundrum, as they exemplify the use of domain-specific
labelling of types of simulated security assessment; in this
case a form of penetration test. A long-term penetration
test, possibly with greater scope of allowed activities (e.g.,
social engineering using approaches such as phishing or
physical access) is often called a red team exercise, which
attempts to test an organisation’s cyber security capabil-
ities against real-world simulations of persistent threats.
Despite this wide variation in service offerings, the central
motivation for their procurement is typically the same –
to generate evidence (e.g., of the efficacy of security con-
trols) that contributes as part of wider security risk man-
agement programs. Such evidence can then be converted
into organisational-specific risks. The effectiveness of sim-
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ulated security assessments in generating this evidence for
security risk management is exemplified in how their usage
is no longer restricted to organisations pursuing the “ex-
tra mile” but in how it is rapidly becoming a mandatory
requirement as part of many organisational standards.
The market for simulated security assessments is in a
relative adolescence, and the complexity and ambiguity of
service models (both in terms of service definitions and
what is delivered against them) may be a consequence of
this. Given this dynamic and the rapidly evolving nature
of the market, it establishes the need to assess the current
state of affairs, and to establish if there is a requirement
for standardisation.
The research presented in this paper has been con-
ducted in partnership with the British Standards Insti-
tution (BSI), the UK national standards body, which is
responsible for originating many of the world’s most com-
monly used management system standards, such as ISO
9001 and ISO/IEC 27001. The overall aim of the research
was to assess the need for standardisation in the area of
simulated security assessments, and provide guidance on
what any proposed standards should include. We do not,
however, restrict ourselves to recommending only formal
standards, and utilise the broader definition of standardi-
sation offered by De Vries [2]:
“activity of establishing and recording a lim-
ited set of solutions to actual or potential match-
ing problems, directed at benefits for the party
or parties involved, balancing their needs and
intending and expecting that these solutions
will be repeatedly or continuously used, dur-
ing a certain period, by a substantial number
of the parties for whom they are meant.”
The benefits of standardisation have been widely dis-
cussed, with links to increases in productivity, globalisa-
tion, exports, and general economic growth [3, 4, 5], as well
as the facilitation of innovation [6]. Standards aid pub-
lic procurement in decision making and risk management,
but individuals involved with public procurement need to
provide a greater input into the development of standards
from the early stages [6]. Any recommendations for stan-
dardisation must be grounded in the realities of industry
practices and client experiences, i.e. to establish the ac-
tual or potential problems to address. It is also important
to understand links to existing standards, what level of
self-organisation of the industry has occurred, and if this
requires explicit standardisation. The research questions
that this study will address are thus:
1. What standards currently exist for simulated secu-
rity assessments?
2. What coordinating bodies exist within the industry
for organisations and individuals?
3. How are current offerings perceived and what are
the prevailing issues surrounding simulated security
assessments?
4. Is there a need for additional standards, or to modify
existing standards?
A requirement for action was identified which led to the
publication of a preliminary white paper [7]. This paper
provides an expanded and academically-focused extension
to this work and makes the following contributions:
1. A review of the simulated security assessment ecosys-
tem, detailing standards requiring assessments, stan-
dards for providing assessments, and individual qual-
ifications for those that do.
2. An analysis of the performance of simulated secu-
rity assessment providers over three phases of an
engagement: pre-engagement, practical assessment,
and post-engagement. Findings are based on the ex-
periences gathered through 54 stakeholder interviews
with providers, clients, and coordinators.
3. A framework for future advancement in the simu-
lated security assessment ecosystem, which includes
both standardisation and industry-led work activi-
ties.
This study predominately addresses the UK landscape,
as this is where the stakeholder interviews were conducted.
However, as will be evidenced in the remainder of the arti-
cle, it can be argued that the UK is leading developments
in this area. We will highlight examples of best practice in
the UK that could be adopted internationally, as well as
discussing international elements where appropriate. The
recommendations for the advancement of the UK ecosys-
tem should be broadly applicable in other countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 the academic literature concerning simulated
security assessments is discussed. The methodology is out-
lined in Section 3. Section 4 then provides a review of
coordinating bodies, standards, and qualifications within
the simulated security assessment ecosystem. The simu-
lated security assessment engagement process is then bro-
ken into phases in Section 5, which includes a discussion on
stakeholder practices and experiences. Recommendations
for future standardisation activities, along with industry-
led improvement are described in Section 6. The paper is
then concluded in Section 7.
2. Related Literature
Despite the significant body of academic literature that
exists on specific techniques within technical security as-
sessments, there has been limited focus on the wider ecosys-
tem of simulated security assessment services. The litera-
ture that has attempted to address this domain falls into
four broad areas.
2.1. Software Development Life Cycle
The first has emphasised the role of simulated security
assessments within the Software or System Development
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Life Cycle (SDLC), which has largely arisen through the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security project “Build Se-
curity In”. Software security best practices were discussed
by McGraw [8, 9], emphasising the importance of integrat-
ing security into the SDLC, in particular the use of pen-
etration testing. A similar emphasis was placed by van
Wyk and McGraw [10] who outline various “touchpoints”
(activities) in the SDLC to achieve this, including code re-
view during implementation (a derivative “assurance tech-
nique” [11] of penetration testing), and penetration testing
during configuration and deployment. A further study by
Arkin et al. [12] focused specifically on software penetra-
tion testing, which emphasises the use of tools during the
SDLC (e.g., static and dynamic analysis tools), along with
the importance of contextualising assessments according to
perceived risk posture.
2.2. Procurement
A second area of research has centred around the pro-
curement of simulated security assessments. A high-level
introduction to the motivations for doing so are provided
by Hardy [13], while Bishop [14] provides discussion around
the thought processes involved in scoping a meaningful
penetration test, and addresses topics such as goal set-
ting, attacker knowledge, resources, and ethics. Geer and
Harthorne [15] highlight the contradictory drivers for pen-
etration tests, which arise through clients desiring adver-
tisable (in the context of demonstrating security to stake-
holders) yet meaningful findings, and providers of services
wanting to primarily succeed in the engagement’s objec-
tives (i.e., to discover flaws). The importance of pene-
tration testing being only one part of a wider security
risk management programme was stressed by Midian [16],
while also introducing common issues found during assess-
ments. The use of counterfactuals (i.e., “what-if” scenar-
ios) in the process of security reasoning is explored by
Herley and Pieters [17], and concludes that despite their
challenges they are a “necessary evil”. Penetration test-
ing as a form of impersonation of such a counterfactual
is discussed. Two further papers focus on procurement
from the client’s perspective, including establishing re-
quirements for organisations providing such services. Tang
[18] emphasises the importance of organisational standards,
and proposes that procurers should look for companies cer-
tified by the Communications-Electronics Security Group
(CESG1) IT Health Check Service (CHECK), the Council
of Registered Ethical Security Testers (CREST), or ISO
17025 (for testing laboratories), and also have ISO/IEC
27001. The requirement for CREST certification is also
proposed by Yeo [19]. Both CHECK and CREST are UK
organisational certifications to provide independent assur-
ance of simulated security assessment providers, and also
offer individual qualifications. A high-level introduction
1CESG is the information security arm of the UK Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
to each, along with other standards and individual quali-
fications in the UK is provided by Xynos et al. [20]. This
topic is examined in greater depth and supplemented with
perceptions of stakeholders in this paper in Section 4.2.
2.3. Methodologies
The third area concerns research around the method-
ological characteristics of simulated security assessments.
In most cases, methodologies have been established at
a high-level of abstraction. An early paper by Pfleeger,
Pfleeger and Theofanos [21] outlined such a methodol-
ogy, while proposing breaking systems into objects that
undergo transactions. A four element methodology (plan-
ning, discovery, exploit, reporting) was proposed by Becht-
soudis and Sklavos [22] who further describe a case study
to identify common security issues and their implications.
Goel and Mehtre [23] provide a basic introduction to the
importance of vulnerability assessments and penetration
testing, along with a linear methodology. Yeo [19] pro-
vides a more detailed methodology for the reconnaissance
and attack phases of a penetration test, which is largely
linear, with a cyclical element where compromise leads to
the requirement for further enumeration. The modelling
of penetration tests using petri nets has been explored
by McDermott [24]. Thompson [25] provides discussion
on penetration testing across three areas: building a test
plan (e.g., in relation to a threat model), executing this
plan (e.g., in terms of the types of testing, such as depen-
dency testing), and the output of this process (e.g., having
clear, detailed reproducible exploit scenarios). Geer and
Harthorne [15] also discussed five aspects of application
penetration testing: why (e.g., motivations for testing),
who (e.g., assessor characteristics) what (e.g., the testing
methodology), where (e.g., in terms of application sub-
systems), and when (e.g., at which point in the SDLC).
Limited research has examined the application of such
methodologies to niche scenarios. One exception to this
can be found in the work on social engineering by Dimkov
et al. [26], which proposes two methodologies: one which
measures the environment surrounding a target asset, and
does not involve social engineering the asset owner, and
a further methodology which is more general, where the
asset owner is in scope and unaware of the assessment.
2.4. Education, Training and Ethics
The fourth area revolves around ensuring the compe-
tencies of individuals performing simulated security assess-
ments. A study by Guard et al. [27] assessed the charac-
teristics of students most suited to conducting penetration
tests within testbed environments. Skillset requirements
and career development of penetration testers were dis-
cussed at a high-level by Caldwell [28]. Qualifications were
explicitly referenced, which include three of the UK bod-
ies, namely CHECK, CREST, and the Tigerscheme, along
with the more internationally focused EC-Council Certi-
fied Ethical Hacker (CEH) and ISC2 Certified Information
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Systems Security Professional (CISSP). The challenges of
designing information security courses that have poten-
tially damaging consequences was examined by Logan and
Clarkson [29] who identified a need for greater emphasis on
the integration of ethics into courses. This need was also
proposed by Saleem [30] and Pashel [31], both of whom
provided a short analysis on teaching penetration testing,
where the main emphasis was placed on preventing mis-
use of taught skillsets. At a high level, such ethical issues
were discussed by Jamil and Khan [32] and Smith, Yur-
cik and Doss [33], with the latter highlighting the ethical
dilemma created by a community which releases security
assessment tools, and then also protects clients against in-
dividuals that use them. A similar theme can be found
in Matwyshyn, Keromytis and Stolfo [34] who explored
the ethics of security vulnerability research. Only three
further papers provided a degree of detailed ethical anal-
ysis. The first was produced by Pierce, Jones and Warren
[35] who established a conceptual model for ethics within
penetration testing which contains five ethical “themes” of
which integrity is at the core. The second was by Ashraf
and Habaebi [36] who reviewed penetration testing ethics
within the context of the Islamic faith. The third was
by Mouton et al. [37] who examine the requirement for
ethics specifically within the context of social engineering.
Additional work has examined the ethical dimensions of
conducting the most common type of social engineering
attack, phishing. Finn and Jakobsson [38] present three
experiments to measure susceptibility to phishing attacks,
discussing how to make them realistic, and ethical. Al-
though not specific to penetration testing, Reece and Stahl
[39] have also conducted a UK-based stakeholder-led study
to examine perceptions around the professionalisation of
information security, which found mixed levels of support.
2.5. Summary
Four areas of academic research have been highlighted
for simulated security assessments; however, two main crit-
icisms can be applied to existing research. First, while the
benefits of such assessments are widely espoused, there has
yet to be a detailed review of the ecosystem for both the
organisations providing such services, and the qualifica-
tions for individuals that work inside such organisations.
Such standards and qualifications have been highlighted
here where mentioned; however, in each case, references
are largely cursory and a lack of analytical depth is ev-
ident. It does, however, highlight the dominance of UK
standards and qualifications, which provides some valida-
tion of this paper’s UK-centric focus. Second, there is
an absence of any empirical review of the effectiveness of
penetration testing in practice. Research has developed
knowledge or established the need for knowledge in dy-
namic areas such as methodologies and ethics; however,
we argue that future research requires a greater under-
standing of what occurs within real-world engagements.
3. Methodology
This paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of
the simulated security assessment industry. The analysis
focuses on UK-based services with reflections on the wider
international implications. The study’s methodology is vi-
sualised in Figure 1. The project can be seen to span three
phases, which encompass the three research questions out-
lined in Section 1. Within Figure 1 the arrowed lines are
used to denote contributing relationships; namely, between
the sequential phases, the activities within these phases,
and where the data sources originate that are used in their
findings.
This first phase frames the contemporary ecosystem for
simulated security assessments. This phase resulted in the
comprehensive review of individual qualifications, organi-
sational standards for those providing simulated security
assessments, organisational standards that mandate an as-
sessment, and the bodies that enforce them. Only through
an understanding of what exists can the understanding of
its performance be contextualised. This performance was
the focus of phase two. To understand the realities of real-
world engagements, in-depth interviews were conducted
with 54 stakeholders about their experiences across three
phases of an engagement: pre-engagement (e.g., scoping),
practical assessment, and post-engagement (e.g., report-
ing). The simulated security assessment ecosystem is not
a static entity; it is under continual evolution. Phase three
is concerned with ensuring such progression occurs in a
manner that benefits all industry stakeholders with the
central objective of improved client security. The role of
standardisation is considered here, along with opportuni-
ties for improvement by the industry itself. This article
has been structured around the three phases: phase one
(ecosystem) can be found in Section 4; phase two (perfor-
mance) in Section 5; phase three (progression) in Section 6.
Two data sources were used within this paper: desk
research and interviews. Each is described further within
Section 3.1 and Section 3.2.
3.1. Desk Research
The predominant mode of data collection used within
phase one was desk research, which established the founda-
tions for later research within phases two and three. Data
sources for desk research fall within four categories.
1. Academic literature was consulted to frame the re-
search from the perspective of academia. A scarcity
of existing literature was identified (see Section 2),
which resulted in the majority of data being sourced
from the remaining three sources.
2. Formal standards (e.g., those from ISO, IEC and
BSI) were reviewed; in total, over 40, after a pre-
liminary analysis to identify those that had relation
to the ecosystem.
3. Consortia standards, which unlike formal standards




























































standards bodies, required data to be collated through
through public sources. This included the analysis
of publicised information on websites (e.g., of trade
associations) and specification documents (e.g., poli-
cies for membership requirements).
4. Community-led literature was also reviewed, which
encompasses what has been produced by both in-
dividuals and collectives (e.g., technical reports by
organisations and community standards).
3.2. Interviews
Stakeholder interviews were conducted to gather the
perceptions and experiences of the challenges and opportu-
nities present within real-world engagements and the wider
ecosystem. Such interviews were primarily used within the
analysis of phase two, but also informed phase one (e.g., for
where information was not publicly available) and phase
three (e.g., for perceptions of future industry direction).
In total, 54 stakeholders were interviewed across 46 sep-
arate interviews. Stakeholders can be divided into three
categories: those that provide assessments (“providers”),
those that receive assessments (“clients”), and those bod-
ies enforcing requirements on the other two stakeholder
types (“coordinators”). The composition of each category
is described below and visualised in Figure 2. The dura-
tion of provider interviews was between 40 minutes and 2
hours, for clients between 25 minutes and 1 hour 15 min-
utes, and for coordinators between 20 minutes and 1 hour
30 minutes.
Providers 32 stakeholders across 27 separate inter-
views, and 22 provider organisations. This includes providers
of simulated security assessments in its various forms. All
but 2 stakeholders were based in the UK. Out of 32 providers,
10 (across 8 organisations) were from CHECK accredited
organisations, and 18 providers (across 13 organisations)
were from CREST member companies. Insufficient infor-
mation was collected to calculate the number of CHECK or
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Figure 2: Stakeholder Composition
individuals do not need to work for CHECK or CREST or-
ganisations, nor does one have to be CHECK or CREST
qualified to work for one.
Clients 15 stakeholders across 12 separate interviews
with 12 client organisations. To achieve a broad repre-
sentation of client experiences, the organisational size of
clients interviewed was highly varied. Client stakehold-
ers ranged from micro enterprises (i.e., <10 employees) to
large enterprises (i.e., >250 employees, with 3 stakeholders
in organisations of >1000 employees, which included a fi-
nancial institution). Furthermore, 5 representatives from
UK local government were interviewed. Included within
the total client count were 2 stakeholders who worked in
consultancy roles (e.g. in one case, as a CESG Listed Ad-
visor Scheme (CLAS) consultant) to procure penetration
tests and identify remediation strategies for third parties.
Coordinators 9 stakeholders across 9 separate inter-
views with 7 coordinators. Included within this count were
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2 stakeholders from provider organisations who also spoke
about their roles within a coordinating body. This count
of 9 stakeholders does not include the 3 providers who
spoke about their work on the community standard, the
Penetration Testing Execution Standard. Stakeholder or-
ganisations were: CESG; CREST; the British Standards
Institution (BSI); the UK Department for Business, In-
novation and Skills (BIS); Tigerscheme; Information As-
surance for Small and Medium Enterprises (IASME); and
Quality Guild (QG) Management Standards.
4. The Simulated Security Assessment Ecosystem
This section describes two perspectives on the simu-
lated security assessment ecosystem. A client-focused per-
spective is taken in Section 4.1, which reviews standards
that mandate particular forms of assessment. Section 4.2
then addresses this from the provider perspective in terms
of qualifications, consortia/private standards, formal stan-
dards, community standards and methodologies for those
delivering such assessments. Preliminary findings from the
interviews for each section are discussed, with a more ex-
pansive analysis of their implications in practice given in
Section 5.
4.1. Standards Requiring Simulated Security Assessments
There are a multitude of reasons why an organisation
would procure or conduct a simulated security assessment.
One notable driver arises through recommended or manda-
tory assessment requirements as part of a wider formal or
private/consortia standard. The standards which make
explicit reference to a requirement for some variation of a
simulated security assessment are discussed below.
Cyber Essentials [40] is an entry-level organisational
standard that provides basic assurance that an organisa-
tion is meeting minimum cyber security control require-
ments. It is targeted at private, not-for-profit and public
organizations of all sizes, although it has particular rele-
vance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). It out-
lines two levels of certification: basic (no formal label)
and “Plus”. The Cyber Essentials standard requires the
completion of a self-assessment form for basic certification,
and self-assessment plus a third-party security assessment
for Plus (including an external and internal vulnerability
scan).
PCI DSS (The Payment Card Industry Data Secu-
rity Standard) [41] enforces a business requirement for the
information security of organisations handling payment
transactions, including those by credit and debit card.
Compliance with PCI DSS is not a legal requirement (with
certain geographical exceptions) but instead a requirement
enforced through business terms (e.g., non-compliance can
result in penalty fines). Requirement 11.2 mandates quar-
terly vulnerability scans, while requirement 11.3 mandates
penetration tests at least once per year and with any sig-
nifiant infrastructure or application modification.
ISO/IEC 27001 – an Information Security Manage-
ment System (ISMS) standard – can be contributed to
with simulated security assessments as audit evidence. In
this case, such assessments are encapsulated as a secu-
rity control under the umbrella of a “technical compli-
ance review”. Security controls within ISO/IEC 27001 are
not mandatory (organisations opt-in or opt-out of secu-
rity controls based upon a risk assessment), and therefore
those under audit to pursue such certification are under
no obligation to possess audit evidence of the results of
a simulated security assessment. ISO/IEC 27001 is, how-
ever, widely used as the basis for other assurance schemes,
and in some cases the “technical compliance review” be-
comes a mandatory requirement (potentially along with
other security controls). One such example is the CESG
Assured Service Telecoms CAS(T)2 for telecommunication
environments.
IT Health Checks (i.e., CHECK assessments) are
another government standard requiring some form of sim-
ulated security assessment. IT Health Checks are for UK
public sector bodies (including local governments) who
wish to participate within the network that interconnects
them: the Public Services Network (PSN).
ISO/IEC 15408 – more commonly known as the Com-
mon Criteria – outlines the requirements for the “secure
functionality of IT products and for assurance measures
applied to these IT products during a security evaluation”
[42]. Penetration testing is frequently cited within the
vulnerability assessment requirements of ISO/IEC 15408-
3:2008 [43].
Interview Findings of Standards for Clients
Two important survey findings were made regarding
the use of simulated security assessments for compliance
where security controls are established.
Firstly, stakeholders from all three categories felt the
link between simulated security assessments and ISO/IEC
27001 was currently “disparate” and poorly documented.
Two interrelated approaches for establishing a link emerged
from early interviews, and subsequent stakeholder views
were widely positive for both. The first approach was to
establish a clear link between the activities within a sim-
ulated security assessments and ISO/IEC 27002 security
controls, and the second was to establish greater auditor
guidance for using assessment findings as audit evidence,
within the larger ISMS audit. Arguably, the former must
happen to enable the latter. Criticism was expressed by
one stakeholder, whose views are notable due to their prox-
imity to the standardisation process. This stakeholder felt
the approach was at odds with the ISO/IEC 27001 model,
which was not about security in itself, but knowing in-
security and planning for continuous improvement. This
stakeholder added: “Why favour a particular method over




security records?” Risk must be identified to be managed,
however, and for other stakeholders, the enthusiasm was
focused on the ability of simulated security assessments to
assess controls in demonstrable terms.
Secondly, whilst the motivations behind Cyber Es-
sentials were widely applauded, it was criticised for its
lack of target market, while provoking explicit and widespread
confusion about its implementation. Such confusion arose
primarily from the heterogeneous approaches of the ac-
creditation bodies. Frequent remarks concerned the inte-
gration of companion standards within Cyber Essentials,
where vulnerability assessments were required (or where
they were not), and the separation of accreditation and
certification status. Some providers further questioned
whether consistency could be achieved due to the ambigu-
ity in the testing guidelines, and the subjectivity required
to implement them.
4.2. Standards and Qualifications for Providing Simulated
Security Assessments
Competence requirements can be established at both
the organisational and individual level. This section pro-
vides a discussion of the current state of the market for
both, along with the views of stakeholders on the require-
ment for modified or new standards in these areas.
4.2.1. For Individuals
Budding and established professionals are now faced
with a multitude of choices for qualifications across a range
of skill levels and topic scopes. UK qualifications for simu-
lated security assessments primarily arise from four providers:
CESG, CREST, Tigerscheme3 and the Cyber Scheme4.
CESG has established a qualification scheme for the IT
Health Check Service (CHECK), which has been in opera-
tion for over a decade. The two levels of CHECK qualifica-
tion are the CHECK Team Member and the CHECK
Team Leader, the latter of which is split over two quali-
fications for infrastructure and web applications. The cur-
rent format requires candidates to have obtained a certain
type and level of industry qualification and Security Clear-
ance (SC) to allow them to handle sensitive data, amongst
other publicly undisclosed factors. The three remaining
qualification bodies, CREST, Tigerscheme and the Cyber
Scheme, provide the industry qualification. Their content,
level and equivalence to CHECK qualifications are shown
in Table 1.
CREST has since emerged as the predominant industry-
led professional qualification body within the UK, and its
qualifications can be seen to span four tiers. In order of
required proficiency, they are CREST Practitioner (requir-
ing an estimated 2,500 hours of experience), Registered
Tester (6,000 hours; CRT), Certified Tester (10,000 hours;
CCT) and Simulated Targeted Attack and Response (STAR).
3http://www.tigerscheme.org
4http://www.thecyberscheme.com
It is at the Certified tier that specialism occurs in the ar-
eas of infrastructure or web application security. STAR
is a framework created to provide intelligence-driven red
team penetration tests for the critical infrastructure sec-
tors. Currently the main implementation of STAR is CBEST5,
which specifically targets the financial sector STAR quali-
fications ensure that competency requirements are met to
perform such engagements. Two forms of STAR quali-
fications exist: those for managers (i.e. those who lead
STAR teams) and those for technical specialists. The
Tigerscheme and Cyber Scheme qualifications follow a
similar structure to the lower three CREST qualifications,
each with a beginner, intermediate and advanced qualifi-
cation. An equivalent to CREST’s STAR qualifications is
not available from other qualification bodies.
CESG has also launched a separate scheme, which forms
a competence framework that is described as a certification
rather than a qualification: the CESG Certified Pro-
fessional (CCP). The CCP is a framework that defines
seven roles, one of which is “Penetration Tester”. Each
role has differing levels of competence, which are aligned
with the responsibility levels defined by the Skills Frame-
work for the Information Age (SFIA)6 and the skill levels
defined by the Institute of Information Security Profes-
sionals (IISP). Four levels are defined for the Penetration
Tester role: SFIA Responsibility Level 3, 4, 5 and 6. CCP,
while listed in Table 1, does not currently contribute to a
CHECK qualification assessment.
The list of qualifications described is not exhaustive
and is UK focused, which has meant many non-UK train-
ing courses and qualifications have been omitted; this is a
consequence of interview findings, which found a greater
emphasis on UK qualifications for recruitment. Despite
this, there are two qualifications worthy of note, both of
which are from US-based providers. First, the Interna-
tional Council of Electronic Commerce Consultants” (EC-
Council) Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH). This qual-
ification can be positioned at the lower spectrum of the
entry-level classification. Despite such positioning, it was
identified to be frequently cited within job advertisements
(typically supplementary to those of Table 1) and it has
seen integration into some UK academic courses. CEH
is not assessed through virtual lab examination, however,
and uses only multiple-choice examination. Second, the
Offensive Security Certified Professional (OSCP). In
contrast to CEH, the interviewees perceived OSCP to be
increasingly popular within the UK market for recruitment
due to its rigorous technical virtual lab examination, and is
the predominant requirement for US-based organisations.
Since the conclusion of this interview process, CREST has
partnered with Offensive Security to establish equivalency































Table 1: Penetration Testing Qualifications
to obtain CRT subject to certain stipulations (i.e., a fee
and a multiple-choice and long-form examination within
six months). CRT obtained in this manner, however, can-
not be used as part of the CHECK application process.
Interview Findings for Individual Qualifications
The consensus amongst stakeholders was a strong op-
position to any form of new standard for individuals. Op-
position was twofold. Firstly, the techniques and skills
used evolve at a rapid pace, which would be infeasible to
capture and keep current within a standards type doc-
ument. Secondly, while the current system is not with-
out fault, existing consortia providers within the UK have
done an exemplary job of raising, setting and assessing the
competence of individuals that conduct simulated security
assessments, and furthermore, the UK is ahead of the rest
of the world in this regard.
Many stakeholders, however, did feel that there was
a growing need for an independent body, modelled in the
same vein as medicine or law, in order to continue the pro-
fessionalisation of simulated security assessments. Taking
medicine as an example, key indicators of its profession-
alisation are the internationally recognised standards for
its practices, and regulation bodies for individuals with
powers such as being able to revoke the right to practise.
Some providers felt that standards bodies, such as BSI,
could facilitate the internationalisation process by working
with technical assessors such as CREST and Tigerscheme.
However, not all stakeholders were positive about such an
endeavour. It was noticeable that those supportive were
predominantly in positions of management, whose natural
proclivity is one of control. Those engaging in the prac-
tical elements of security assessments, the practitioners,
had fears about the potential future exploitation of such
a scheme to regulate those who wish to conduct cyber se-
curity research. It was felt that such a situation would
negatively impact the industry as a whole, and lead to the




Confidence in a provider’s process readiness to deliver
simulated security assessments can be created through or-
ganisational standards. Such standards fall broadly into
two areas: those from consortia and those from formal
standards organisations (e.g. BSI directly or ISO/IEC).
Private/consortia standards are those used most predom-
inantly; such standards can be visualised using a tiered
model, in which the hierarchy is formed by the level of
intended rigour of the simulated security assessments that
they provide. The reader should note that this is a rough
categorisation, and there remains potential for offerings to
move between tiers based upon client requirements. This

































Figure 3: A Tiered Model of Provider Standards
Tier One is concerned with external vulnerability as-
sessments. The Cyber Essentials scheme [40] was in-
troduced in Section 4.1, along with its two types of cer-
tification: Basic and Plus. Provider organisations can be
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accredited (i.e., to become certification bodies) to deliver
one or both levels by one of the four accreditation bodies.8
Only one accreditation body, CREST, has implemented
their version of the Cyber Essentials scheme to deliver
simulated security assessments at this tier. CREST man-
dates that external vulnerability assessments must be con-
ducted, on top of the “core” requirements of the scheme
(i.e., a self-assessment form), in order to ensure border
controls are properly implemented [44].
Tier Two expands the engagement scope of Tier One
vulnerability assessments. Two main standards exist. The
first is Cyber Essentials Plus. All accreditation bod-
ies deliver assessments that meet the criteria set forth by
the “Common Test Specification” [45] which outlines the
mandatory internal and external assessments, along with
success criteria. Assessments include vulnerability scans
and configuration reviews (e.g., assessing ingress malware
filtering at the boundary, server, and workstation levels).
The second fulfils requirement 11.2 of PCI DSS for pe-
riodic vulnerability scans. The PCI Security Standards
Council mandates that such vulnerability scans must be
conducted by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV). Cer-
tification to become an ASV involves a simulated assess-
ment on PCI Security Standards Council infrastructure
to evaluate technical competence, and organisations must
recertify annually.
Tier Three sees a shift towards increasingly adver-
sarial engagements, and what are widely considered pene-
tration tests. The most well-established industry-led body
providing certification here is CREST The application
process covers four domains of organisational capability:
(a) information security; (b) operating procedures and stan-
dards; (c) methodology; and (d) personnel security, train-
ing and development. Both the ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO
9001 management system standards are referenced in CREST’s
guidance for applicants, but not mandated. However, CREST
does require evidence of operational commitment to the
implementation of an information security management
system (ISMS) and a quality management system (QMS).
Furthermore, CREST requires a clear and documented
complaints procedure for Member Companies, with an es-
calation path that makes direct reference to the CREST
complaints process for independent arbitration. PCI DSS
requirement 11.3 for periodic penetration tests does not
mandate any certification requirements for providing or-
ganisations. Instead, a de facto standardisation is enforced
(represented by the red area within Figure 3) through the
certification process when an appointed individual and/or
organisation assesses whether requirements have been met
to an appropriate level To facilitate this process PCI DSS
have released supplementary penetration testing guidance
[46], which includes recommended provider competencies
(e.g. qualifications), methodologies (notably including em-
8This can be seen through the example of provider organi-
sations accredited by CREST: http://www.cyberessentials.org/
certifying-bodies/
phasis on the importance of exploitation), and reporting.
Within competency guidelines, it is noteworthy that the
only organisational certifications promoted were the UK’s
CHECK and CREST.
Tier Four bears a close resemblance to Tier Three
with respect to assessment expectations and required com-
petencies; however, it differs in its establishment of “non-
standard” requirements (e.g., for providers to have achieved
security clearance). The primary standard here is CHECK,
a governmental initiative operated by CESG, which en-
ables approved organisations to perform penetration tests
for government departments and public sector bodies (in-
cluding Her Majesty’s Government). Organisational ap-
proval requires evidence submission in two areas: (a) capa-
bility (e.g. testing methodology and examples of previous
reports) and (b) the composition of a CHECK team (at
least one CHECK Team Leader and one CHECK Team
Member). There are a multitude of specialised engage-
ment types that would fall into this category but have
no formally defined offering. An example would be pene-
tration tests involving safety-critical infrastructures (e.g.,
Industrial Control Systems). The requirements present
within this level may also apply to some CREST engage-
ments.
Tier Five engagements are those that require a similar
or higher level of expertise as Tier Four, but differ predomi-
nantly in the length of the engagement and list of permissi-
ble activities. Tier Five may therefore be considered a form
of red team engagement. Although many providers have
red team capabilities there currently only exists one organ-
isational standard to provide oversight within this market.
This falls under what CREST refer to as the STAR frame-
work, which offers threat intelligence-led red team exer-
cises to the critical infrastructure sectors. Currently the
main implementation of STAR is CBEST [47, 48] which
establishes mandatory testing requirements in the finan-
cial sector. CBEST engagements may utilise government
issued intelligence provided by the UK Financial Author-
ities, which may not be available for other STAR engage-
ments.
Formal Standards: The discussion has focused on
the private/consortia standards that dominate this do-
main. However, formal (technical) standards also exist
that describe activities relating to simulated security as-
sessments, or mandate their use. One widely used stan-
dard for security evaluations is ISO/IEC 15408 (Common
Criteria). The methodology for such evaluations are out-
lined in ISO/IEC 18045. Various challenges prevent the
widespread application of ISO/IEC 15408 to simulated
security assessments, such as high information require-
ments about target environments, and the challenges of
applying it to a dynamic and live system. However, at-
tempts to mitigate this have been provided in supplemen-
tal standards; for example, PD ISO/IEC TR 19791 ex-
tends ISO/IEC 15408 to cover operational environments,
while ISO/IEC TR 20004 uses the Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE) and the Common Attack Pattern
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Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) frameworks to
support ISO/IEC 18045 vulnerability assessments.
Interview Findings of Standards for Providers
Isolated criticisms were raised against consortia/private
standards (e.g. a lack of independence from industry in
their governance); however, the predominant voice amongst
stakeholders was that they have done much to raise the
standard of operational readiness and professionalism of
providers within the UK. Indeed, approval for both CREST
and CHECK was frequently cited as a motivation for the
adoption of management system standards by providers,
predominantly ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001.
Although the benefits of some formal standards were
espoused (e.g. the thoroughness of Common Criteria), the
consensus was that it would prove difficult to implement
these standards for the types of services and timescales
for testing that clients were demanding. A small number
of providers suggested standardising a methodology; how-
ever, this was mostly only seen as an option if standardisa-
tion was forced. Other stakeholders questioned the benefit
of such a “high-level” standard, feeling there was already
a significant quantity of information in the public domain
on this topic. Efforts to create such a standard have been
considered (and continue to be) by the subcommittee that
developed the ISO/IEC 27000 series (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC
27), although there is not yet any standard published or
in development on this topic.
The performance of these standards and certifications
for providers in practice (including methodologies used)
will be discussed in Section 5.
4.3. Community Standards and Methodologies
Many of the guidelines and standards for conducting
assessments have not come from formal standards insti-
tutions, but instead have been generated by the security
community and other interested stakeholders. This sec-
tion details those activities self-described as standards,
and then finally those that can be broadly defined as guide-
lines and methodologies.
The Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES)9
is a community standard that provides guidelines for the
full scope of penetration testing activities over seven stages:
pre-engagement, intelligence gathering, threat modelling,
vulnerability analysis, exploitation, post-exploitation, re-
porting. Although the majority of these stages are tech-
nical evaluations, PTES itself does not specify technical
guidelines on how to conduct a penetration test engage-
ment, instead describing the process at a conceptual level.
However, PTES has produced a set of technical guidelines
to accompany the standard10, which includes the specifica-
tion of particular tools and instructions on their use. A fur-




Application Security Project (OWASP) project, whose aims
are to improve the state of web application security through
the provision of guidelines, reports, and tools. OWASP
have created the Application Security Verification Stan-
dard (ASVS) v2.0 which outlines a methodology for as-
sessing web application security controls.
Other publications are available that do not purport to
be standards, but instead act as guidelines and method-
ologies. Some are generically focused including the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Spe-
cial Publication 800-115 [49] (which is considered best prac-
tice in PCI DSS [41]) and the Open Source Security Test-
ing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) [50]. Other guide-
lines and methodologies are more technology-specific, such
as OWASP’s “Testing Guide” for assessing web applica-
tions. Furthermore, there have been industry-specific pub-
lications that address the challenges of assessing systems
within environments that require non-standard approaches
during a simulated security assessment. For example, the
United States Department of Homeland Security have pro-
duced high-level guidelines on the use and challenges of
penetration tests for assessing Industrial Control System
(ICS) security [51]. A more thorough methodology is pre-
sented by the National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Or-
ganization Resource (NESCOR) [52] which addresses pen-
etration tests for assessing electric utilities in particular.
NESCOR includes within its scope guidelines for assess-
ing embedded components, which is largely unaddressed
within other methodologies in favour of network and web
application security. An extension of this can be seen in
the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (i.e., a sub-system
within the smart grid) Attack Methodology [53]. This pub-
lication outlines a methodology at the technical level for
penetration testing embedded devices that exist outside of
a utility’s security perimeter (e.g., on customer premises).
Interview Findings for Community Standards and
Methodologies
Due to the pragmatic nature of the publications de-
scribed within this section, their impact will not be dis-
cussed here, but rather in Section 5, in order to frame
this discussion within the context of experiences from real-
world engagements.
4.4. Summary of key findings
Several key findings on the existing ecosystem and how
it is viewed by stakeholders are worth highlighting:
• The link between simulated security assessments and
ISO/IEC 27001 should be strengthened.
• The UK leads the rest of the world in raising, set-
ting and assessing the competence of professionals
conducting simulated security assessments.
• There is support for an independent body, similar to
to medicine or law, to continue the professionalisa-
tion of the field.
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• Existing consortia/private standards have done much
to raise the level of operational readiness and profes-
sionalism of providers within the UK, including the
adoption by providers of management system stan-
dards (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001).
5. The Engagement Process
Stakeholders were also questioned on their practices
and experiences around simulated security assessments.
To contextualise the findings, the terminology for an en-
gagement’s subprocesses has been defined through a refer-
ence model in Figure 4. This reference model was derived
from stakeholder responses. The model splits an engage-
ment into three broad phases: pre-engagement, practical
and post-engagement.
The pre-engagement phase is concerned with establish-
ing the parameters of allowed activity for the practical
assessment. There will be some form of initial interac-
tion which may be initiated by the provider or the client.
A chosen methodology (e.g. questionnaires or interviews)
will be used by the provider to generate a scoping pro-
posal. This proposal may go through multiple rounds of
negotiation. The client will then sign off on the proposal
before the practical assessment begins.
The practical assessment phase involves the exposure of
a client system or component to a simulated attack. The
phase begins with information gathering. This may un-
cover systems that necessitate further discussions around
the engagement scope (e.g. if a client uses systems owned
or operated by third parties and there are questions of
testing authorisation). A provider may conduct a threat
analysis or move straight to its subsequent stage, a vulner-
ability analysis. Exploitation of identified vulnerabilities
may occur in order to attempt penetration of the system,
and to gain access to additional resources (e.g. sensitive
data or higher system privileges). The subprocesses of the
practical assessment stage may go through multiple repe-
titions (e.g. a compromised system may be connected to
another internal network which, if under scope, can also
be attacked).
The post-engagement phase is concerned with the de-
livery of findings to the client, usually in the form of a
written report. The majority of providers will supplement
this with additional forms of client interaction (e.g. final
meetings) in order to educate them about the findings and
the remedial actions that need to be undertaken.
Comments resulting from the stakeholder interviews
concerning these three stages of the penetration test en-
gagement will now be discussed in turn.
5.1. Pre-Engagement
The quality of the marketing collateral of pene-
tration testing companies leaves a lot to be de-
sired. I think it’s a marketplace that’s shrouded
in mystery and myth. It’s very difficult as a
person wishing to purchase penetration testing
and IT Health Check services ... to assess the
marketplace and find out whether or not your
potential vendors will satisfy what you require,
other than them being able to say that they’re
CREST or CHECK registered ... it almost feels
like you need to be an expert yourself to buy an
expert to come in and help you ... Being able to
come up with a framework with which you can
engage these suppliers, and understand the na-
ture of the different tests that they will do, and
how they will treat that information in terms
of reporting it back, and there being some con-
sistency across the marketplace ... I think that
would be a very welcome development.
A client of penetration tests
5.1.1. Terminology
There was a notable sense of confusion and frustration
amongst stakeholders about the ambiguity in what consti-
tutes a penetration testing service. Such ambiguity was
evident from the varied service definitions of providers,
in particular around the level of exploitation that occurs
during engagements. A number of providers stated that
vulnerabilities within engagements were not exploited by
default, with additional value provided through theorised
exploitation and/or false negative and positive verification.
This caused a commonly cited issue during the tender pro-
cess, which was found to be increasingly common for the
procurement of simulated security assessments. Clients
were often found to be unable to differentiate between
providers, even amongst some of those that had approved
CHECK or CREST status, while providers argued that
clients often failed to understand their requirements, pro-
vided limited opportunities for consultation, and made
procurement decisions based predominantly on economic
factors. Providers argued that this could lead to clients
failing to procure a level of testing rigour appropriate to
the requirements of their environment. Some providers felt
this was in part because clients are not concerned with the
quality of the test: “clients are just looking for a tick in the
box and resent any issues found”. The issue from client
and provider perspectives is related, and can arguably be
reduced to issues with terminology for defining services.
The definition of consistent terminology was widely
supported amongst providers (18) and clients (5)11. An-
other two providers expressed support at a conceptual
level, but argued practical definitions were difficult to de-
termine; the subjective nature of exploitation was cited
as an issue by one provider. Questions around terminol-
ogy arose from an early interview with a provider who
suggested that the market would benefit from BSI work-
ing with industry partners to define testing types. This
11These figures were reached without all stakeholders being ques-



















Figure 4: Phases of a Penetration Testing Engagement
provider argued that “it might not be right; it might get
slaughtered, but it’s a stake in the ground”, where clients
can say they want a peer defined simulated security eval-
uation (e.g. vulnerability assessment or penetration test)
and have a clearer understanding of the service that they
desire and what will be delivered.
As the support for terminology definitions suggests, the
industry is acutely aware of the issues caused by the lack of
precise terminology. One initiative with potential industry
impact is the community standard, PTES. The upcoming
version of the PTES is stated to have “levels” of testing.
Supportive providers felt levels would empower clients and
facilitate the process of procuring a certain type or level
of test. If a provider was then to fail to deliver the re-
quirements of that level, they would be in breach of con-
tract. One non-PTES provider was supportive of a level
approach; however, they urged caution with definitions,
as part of the process of adding value is having the power
to deviate. Such issues could easily be addressed through
clarifying testing requirements in pre-engagement negotia-
tions. If a standard is too specific, however, it could cause
issues if clients do not need an aspect of that test, and
do not understand why they do not need it. Providers
would then need to deliver unnecessary services to meet
that level.
An alternative solution proposed by one coordinator
used a measure of the client’s risk appetite to map onto in-
dustry services; however, it received strong opposition due
to the difficulty in computing risk appetite (even amongst
those versed in its specialism) and the lack of potential for
internationalisation where many providers wished to focus
their efforts.
5.1.2. Scoping
The scoping procedures of providers were found to have
formed a de facto standard, with strong commonalities
in the basic stages (see Figure 4), methodologies to de-
rive client requirements (predominantly questionnaires),
the structure of scoping proposals, and types of testing
proposed (almost wholly white box). Client views on scop-
ing were polemic. Providers were largely seen as pro-
viding adequate assistance; however, in some cases they
were criticised for their excessive use of questionnaires
and lack of face-to-face meetings, even by larger clients.
One CESG Listed Advisors Scheme (CLAS) consultant ar-
gued that you “often can’t interact with penetration test-
ing providers”. For some providers, especially the micro
enterprises, face-to-face meetings were pursued at all op-
portunities to differentiate themselves against the rise of
“faceless” providers.
Larger enterprises were considered to be the only clients
who understood their requirements, and this often mani-
fested in engagements with strict guidelines, goals and de-
liverables. Small providers were deemed to require greater
levels of assistance, but have grown increasingly knowl-
edgeable over the past three to five years through their
periodic audits. A common area of contention amongst
stakeholders was found in industries that mandate simu-
lated security assessments; notably in the CHECK scheme
for Public Services Network (PSN) compliance and PCI
DSS. Multiple CHECK requiring clients expressed the opin-
ion that their peers were intentionally narrowing the scope
of engagements to minimise risk for any issues found due to
the punitive nature of the scheme. Two CHECK providers
stated that they had heard of such issues themselves. One
client insisted that they were interested in having an ex-
pansive scope for the CHECK scheme. Such an approach
provides financial benefits over having one approach for as-
pects critical to PSN compliance, and another non-mandatory
test for other services. However, the punitive nature dis-
courages such an approach, with the additional complex-
ity that any issues found lead to poor reflection of security
capabilities compared to peer organisations. The Cabi-
net Office does provide a four-page document (two pages
of content) on scoping CHECK; however, for the clients
the call was clear: greater guidance is needed to ensure
consistency within the scheme.
5.1.3. Authorisation
Questions of authorisation arose when engagements in-
volved third party services. All providers stated confir-
mation was sought before engagements began; however,
the methods used varied. The preferred method involved
the client signing a document to state their legal author-
ity to test systems within scope, with the provider re-
quiring no further proof. One provider stated this was
because it was “too time-consuming to check it all”. A
minority of providers required explicit confirmation from
the third party. Cloud services were an exception, with
providers often demanding email or written confirmation
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from the cloud service. Such authorisation was found to
be obtained with relative ease, except for smaller or “non-
Western” cloud services. Providers stated that undisclosed
third party systems were often uncovered during the initial
reconnaissance stage of the practical assessment, notably
with mail servers, and that the lack of third party autho-
risation was a common reason for delayed testing.
5.1.4. International Engagements
Providers were questioned on their understanding of
the legality for conducting engagements outside UK bor-
ders. Providers were largely unaware, with the bigger
providers stating that such engagements would be cleared
by their legal department. The general approach was to
offset risk onto the client on the assumption they would
have greater knowledge of local laws, and to ensure to
never stray from the scope set out for the engagement.
Legal cover would then be provided by authorisation from
the client. One provider felt there was not enough legal
guidance around the Computer Misuse Act (1990), even
within the UK. “Where does the Misuse Act stop and
a new law begin?” This proved to be a bigger issue for
smaller provider organisations. One such provider stated
that they have had multiple enquiries about work from the
USA; however, they have not taken on business because
they do not understand how “protected they are”. This
provider felt that UK government Trade & Investment de-
partment should be making more effort within this do-
main. “They have to understand that process and advise
if they’re wanting to push an export strategy” for cyber
security services.
5.2. Practical Assessment
Known hostilities towards standardisation of the tech-
nical aspects of simulated security assessments led to a
strategic choice in study design to focus on other aspects
of engagements; however, stakeholder interviews identified
three areas of note.
5.2.1. Exploitation
The first bears relation to the question of terminology,
and concerns the extent of provider exploitation, which
can be seen as a key differentiator for service definitions.
For many providers, there was an aversion to exploita-
tion. For some providers their default policy was to not
exploit, beyond basic false positive and false negative test-
ing (e.g., for SQL injection, using a single apostrophe to
raise a database error). In one case the provider expanded
upon their approach, describing the creation of scenar-
ios to determine if an attack is feasible “on the balance
of probability”. Furthermore, one provider stated that
while exploitation occurred on some of their engagements,
“most” of their clients do not like it, and so it is not con-
ducted. Where exploitation was described as being used,
the general consensus amongst providers was to “only use
exploits we’re sure about”, “talk to clients if there is a risk
to live services” and to liaise with the client and “seek ap-
proval” before exploitation. One provider described how
sometimes clients will not want the provider to exploit,
but would want them to continue on as if exploitation has
worked. In such a scenario, the provider would be given
SSH access, and continue from there. For some providers
this serves as a welcome professionalisation of the industry,
and a significant improvement from the time (described as
only 5-10 years ago in one case) when exploits were fre-
quently untargeted (e.g., to the specific operating system
and service patch), launched en-masse, and used without
full knowledge of their contents. Other providers were
more critical of this shift. Although it was infrequently
discussed in stakeholder interviews, for some providers the
short length of engagements meant that they felt there was
no longer time to do rigorous testing of proof-of-concept
exploits before their use in engagements, which could also
be a contributor to the move towards scenario-based, no
exploitation testing where no “penetration” occurs.
5.2.2. Methodologies
The second concerns methodologies and their limited
use by providers, which may reflect on the diversity of ser-
vice models. As one might expect, no provider followed
one particular methodology, and instead considered their
methodology to be a synthesis of community standards.
Out of the 32 providers, 10 mentioned Open Source Se-
curity Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) and 16
mentioned Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
in general terms, with three providers more specifically
mentioning the OWASP Testing Guide. Other method-
ologies in use during the interviews were the PTES by
six providers and those adopted by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (again in gen-
eral terms, without reference to a specific standard) by
three providers. One provider noted that NIST 800-115
has gained prominence in the past year, due to the new
PCI DSS version 3 standard, but described it as “old and
invalid”. Providers stated that no public methodologies
were followed for high assurance and/or safety-critical en-
vironments requiring specialist approaches, such as indus-
trial control systems, as in their experience, none had been
created (the ecosystem review of Section 4.3, however,
showed a small number exist). It is also worth noting that
both the CHECK and CREST schemes require organisa-
tions to have defined a methodology that is to be reviewed
before acceptance onto the schemes. Although providers
mentioned methodologies in this study, in some cases, re-
sponses seemed more of an attempt to demonstrate their
methodologies received influences from external sources.
A selection of elicited responses can be seen below.
“We’re aligned to OWASP”
“Whatever’s available”
“A combination of everybody’s”




Provider responses did, however, demonstrate that there
has yet to be a methodology (for the mainstream target en-
vironments: network, web and mobile) that has received
widespread adoption within the industry. The lack of a
consistent peer reviewed methodology does not necessar-
ily indicate that providers are doing an inadequate job in
terms of coverage. Providers frequently stated that they
do their best to identify as many vulnerabilities as possi-
ble within the duration of the engagement. It does, how-
ever, suggest a reluctance to have an external methodol-
ogy forced upon them. In the opinion of the providers,
this allows them the flexibility to tailor their offerings to
their clients. It might also be a reflection of the difficul-
ties in defining a methodology in a fast changing, highly
complex environment. Despite the lack of utilisation of
peer reviewed methodologies, there was the consensus that
methodologies play a key role in emerging markets, by im-
proving client education and establishing a rough de facto
standardisation of assessment activities. Such methodolo-
gies, however, were perceived to best manifest through in-
dustry and community efforts.
Standards that specify requirements for the practical
assessment can be seen to enforce a form of methodologi-
cal requirement, and therefore, provider perceptions about
this form of standardisation were understandably nega-
tive. Perceptions on this topic are best illustrated in light
of OWASP ASVS, which as a community developed stan-
dard, and a document open to peer review, presents an
ideal opportunity to discuss stakeholders views on this
form of standardisation. These views can largely be sum-
marised as ignorance or indifference. With respect to the
lack of knowledge about OWASP ASVS, multiple providers
suggested a lack of awareness of many OWASP projects be-
yond the Top 10 and Testing Guide. As one provider sum-
marised, “OWASP is interesting. For some reason outside
the Top 10 their work is not picked up by the industry”.
A small number of providers had heard of the OWASP
ASVS, and two providers had done tests to it, but only on
client requests. For some, ASVS was met with criticism
due to its lack of differentiation between white and black
box testing, and did not account for the limited willing-
ness for clients to release source code. A counter to this
criticism could be made, however, in that it is only the
higher levels of verification within the standard that re-
quire source code review. A further felt that it would be
impossible to meet the requirements of the standard in the
short time frames clients are willing to procure for testing,
even for their more experienced testers. Other providers
were more positive, but never so far as having the desire to
use it widely. One provider did state that although they
did not use OWASP ASVS, because it was a third party
document, it was “good as a sales tool”. Another provider
felt ASVS’s failure to penetrate the market was not so
much a failing with the standard itself, but due to a lack
of demand in the buying community. “If the buying com-
munity is not asking for it, providers won’t be willing to
spend the time implementing it. If the buying community
wanted it, the industry would be all over it.”
5.2.3. Social Engineering
Approaches to social engineering engagements were also
discussed with providers. Services described fell into two
categories: First, scenario-focused in the manner that so-
cial engineering is traditionally understood (e.g., with a
specific end goal). Second, audit-based social engineering
(e.g., to determine the awareness level of a department).
For where “human exploitation” occurs within social en-
gineering, providers offering this service described a ro-
bust sign-off process, often with multiple stages. A typical
provider described process involved scoping and the de-
termination of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources
(e.g., social media), the use of OSINT to discover informa-
tion about an organisation and its employees, the creation
of attack scenarios, and the proposal of those scenarios to
the client, who would then decide whether they wished the
provider to proceed or not. In multiple cases the provider
stated that the client would return a list of alternative
targets for the scenarios to the ones proposed (e.g., OS-
INT might reveal information on a C-Suite member, but
the client may want to target those in lower positions).
Providers were generally adamant about the discussion of
any social engineering attack before its use, “otherwise
it’s easy to get into hot water” and there’s a “poten-
tially higher risk for things to go wrong”. Most providers
described their services as being scenario-focused, with
a smaller number being audit-focused, although in some
cases offered both.
Client sign-off opens a separate issue; the ethics and le-
gal aspects of social engineering. Two providers described
situations where it was the client asking the provider for
testing with potentially ethically dubious motivates (e.g.,
perform a phishing attack on a department, crack the pass-
words, and provide the names of the 10 individuals with
the worst passwords). These providers stated that it is of-
ten them as testers that have to inform the client that such
behaviour would not be ethical. Despite this, the majority
of providers did state that there was complex negotiations
before social engineering occurs, which often involves a
client organisation’s Human Resources (HR) department,
or at the minimum, the provider suggests the client con-
tact their HR department before testing. Anonymisation
of victims of social engineering received strong responses
from both perspectives. Of the providers that gave a clear
answer, five said no (across two organisations) and seven
said yes (across six organisations) to anonymising results.
One provider that said no, stated: “It would be wrong
to anonymise anything. The client commissioned the test,
and the client owns the results when you give it to them”.
The argument for anonymisation was largely that it is a
training and policy failing and “not a finger pointing ex-
ercise”. In one case, the provider stated that they request
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HR be at debrief meetings to emphasise this point. Some-
times anonymisation is inadequate as it is easy to deter-
mine the target (e.g., the receptionist at the front desk on
a particular day and time). In these situations some of the
“yes” providers stated that they try to obfuscate results.
One provider argued that due to the ease in which social
engineering attacks succeed, they do agree that one per-
son within the client organisation can know the names, to
allow for technical remediation (e.g., resetting passwords).
A further provider stated that they get the client to sign
a document stating that they will not take action against
employees found to be targets of the test. Other providers
could not give a hard yes or no answer to anonymisation,
but general practice is that they “tend not to give names”.
Two of the providers did state they have felt pressure from
client organisations to disclose names. In one case they
stated that sometimes the client asks informally and they
“may tell them, may not”.
With respect to the legal and ethical aspects when con-
ducting social engineering assessments, one provider sum-
marised this as “a minefield”. This is notably the case
in scenario-driven tests that involve any form of physi-
cal penetration. There was a strong consensus amongst
stakeholders that the provider community would bene-
fit from a synthesis of ethical and legal material on this
topic into a common source, such as a set of guidelines or
a code of ethics. Providers views included “it might be
useful”,“if there was one it would be really useful”,“some
framework at the level of ethics would be useful” and“it
needs to be done - I can imagine the arguments though”.
One provider did state they had previously searched for
guidelines but without success. Another argued that “a
code of ethics in the UK would likely see some success and
approval” due to the requirement for being “whiter than
white” as a penetration tester, compared to other coun-
tries in the world where a criminal history is sometimes
encouraged or overlooked. Clients also expressed a de-
sire to see greater ethical and legal guidelines. One client
argued that “at that level they’re not engaging with cus-
tomers but its employees on an interpersonal level”, with
another client adding, “there should be guidelines. For the
protection of those doing the testing as much as anything
else”. CREST was the body of choice for any guidance
for two providers, with the suggestion that it integrates
with their complaints process. “[It] should definitely be
from CREST”. Some providers, including those who were
pro-guidelines, did express that such an endeavour must
be cautious not to constrict the industry and the value
of testing. During one client interview, the interviewee
“could not comment” on whether social engineering had
been conducted in tests on their organisation, although
could discuss other technical tests (e.g., network and web
application penetration testing). One could argue that
this is perhaps indicative of how people perceive social
engineering and the sensitivity of human-focused testing,
which strengthens the need for clarification on ethical and
legal guidelines.
5.3. Post-Engagement
“I’ve never seen any wow reports, but a lot of
bad ones”
“Shocking”
“Generally very hit and miss”
“Appalling”
Providers on the reports of other providers
“Underwhelming” was the overarching theme in the
perceptions of reporting from providers and clients. Providers
expressed satisfaction with the quality of their own re-
ports, but had largely disapproving opinions of the reports
produced by other providers. A small number of providers
felt there was some consistency between their direct com-
petitors, with one large provider arguing that a level of
consistency had been achieved through the movements of
individuals between provider organisations.
“The quality varies immensely ... the quality
can be atrocious”
“Often basically a Nessus output in PDF for-
mat”
“Very impressed”
“... great deal of variability”
“Some are atrocious; others well thought out”
“The quality of the document was high”
“No significant quality variation”
“Some are so shocking, it’s hilarious”
Clients on reporting quality
Client interviews highlighted a significant perceived vari-
ability in the quality of reports from providers. The above
quotes were extracted from the views of eight clients in
eight organisations. One interesting finding was that the
smaller clients had the best opinions on the quality of re-
porting. Generally, the larger the client (typically, there-
fore, with a greater in-house IT capability), the greater
the perceived variability.
Two widely cited issues that will not be discussed in de-
tail here are the mis-marketing of vulnerability assessment
services as penetration testing services, and the “quality”
of report content. The former is a systemic issue that
stems from pre-engagement negotiations. The latter is
about individual capability, which stakeholders strongly
felt should be the responsibility of technical bodies.
5.3.1. Reporting Structure
All providers were found to follow a similar high-level
reporting structure. At its most basic, all reports were de-
scribed to have a managerial and technical section. Man-
agerial sections typically contained the executive summary
and engagement details (e.g. scope). Clients were mod-
erately satisfied with provider efforts, but many felt man-
agerial sections were still too technical, and often needed
rewriting for internal communications. The technical sec-
tion broadly contained the lists of discovered vulnerabil-
ities and recommendations. The provider’s implementa-
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tions for both were varied. Some best practices for report-
ing structure that were noted include the use of document
histories, information on providers involved in testing (e.g.
qualifications), attack narratives (e.g., a descriptive expla-
nation of what route was taken by the assessor in attacking
the target), root cause recommendations and appendices of
test data (e.g. logs of tool outputs and systems “touched”
during testing).
5.3.2. Vulnerability Scoring
The first major issue highlighted was the diverse use
of default metrics for scoring vulnerabilities. The Com-
mon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) version 2.0 was
mentioned frequently, and was often mandated by some
clients; however, providers were critical of it in its current
form, arguing that it was only suitable for certain tech-
nologies, its scores often did not reflect real-world risks,
and that it failed to account for vulnerability chains (e.g.
multiple medium risk vulnerabilities created one of high
risk) or the presence of mitigating security controls. In-
stead, providers frequently described the use of alternative
metrics, such as: qualitative scores (usually high, medium
and low); impact to Confidentiality, Integrity or Availabil-
ity (CIA); ease of exploitation; proprietary CVSS deriva-
tives; or a combination of multiple metrics in a matrix.
For clients, the variety of scoring mechanisms was found
to be problematic for tracking performance over time and
comparing results between providers. Furthermore, issues
were felt to be compounded due to the subjectivity in ar-
riving at a particular score, such as when providers tried to
adapt CVSS to account for its aforementioned limitations,
or address one or more aspects using their own metric sys-
tem. The survey highlighted a strong opposition to the
potential for mandating a specific metrics system, as this
is where providers felt their value was generated; however,
some providers did feel that clients mandating the inclu-
sion of unmodified CVSS scores regardless of the use of an-
other “main” metric system would provide a “quick win”
for consistency within the industry. Version 3.0 of CVSS
is currently in development, and some providers expressed
the hope that this would lead to a natural resolution and
improvement of this issue.
5.3.3. Recommendations
Another area of concern was the quality and content
of recommendations. Smaller clients were the most sat-
isfied, with larger clients having more qualms. Frequent
criticisms included the lack of prioritisation (beyond the
implicit prioritisation based on the vulnerability score),
categorisation, and root cause analysis. Root cause analy-
sis featured heavily in client demands, but providers were
largely seen to be failing to deliver on this. One client
was particularly critical of CHECK reports for their lack
of root cause analysis, stating that it “rarely happens in
their CHECK reports” and that there is “no interpretation
of results”. Only seven providers (six organisations) stated
that they included any root cause analysis in any form of
penetration test report, although more did state that rec-
ommendations were prioritised. One of the largest clients
in the project went further to argue that providers need
to include scenarios in their root cause analysis to enable
a greater understanding of vulnerability chains and their
impact. Interestingly, a criticism of clients that arose at
multiple points within the study was the claim that they
often only spot fix, rather than address root causes, and
that issues continue to appear in subsequent engagements
(e.g. their yearly audit). While the ultimate responsibility
to address systemic issues lies with the client, based on the
findings in this study, it would be difficult to claim that
many providers are going to great lengths to facilitate this.
5.3.4. Validation of Vulnerabilities
The final issue was once a client has implemented reme-
diation to vulnerabilities, they then have two options for
validating its efficacy. They could either obtain a retest of
the vulnerabilities (usually at an additional cost) or test
for the vulnerability themselves. Most clients of penetra-
tion testing engagements do not have the skills or train-
ing to understand and recreate the vulnerabilities them-
selves, which therefore means they must be empowered to
do so. Only nine providers (seven organisations) stated
that proof-of-concepts were included within their reports
(e.g. a single command or script that can be queried or
executed to demonstrate the issue), with clients describing
their presence as rare. The majority of providers offered
retests instead, although some providers stated that some
information was provided, such as “what tools were used”.
The majority of clients expressed an interest in proof-of-
concepts being made available, with some clients stating
that they would also like to see attack narratives. One
client stated that this was because remediation is often un-
done, and attack narratives would facilitate better under-
standing of cyber threats and empower them to implement
more effective mitigating security controls. A provider ar-
gued that not including narratives or proof-of-concepts in
reports was a “business decision” by provider organisa-
tions, with another suggesting the same issues, arguing
that this information will typically be produced to enable
them to conduct a retest anyway. The provision of such
information aids in educating the client to improve their
security, but doing so would not be financially beneficial
for providers.
5.3.5. Improving Reporting
The difficulty in achieving greater quality of reporting
is balancing the need for consistency with the resistance
to standardisation and the providers’ desire to maintain
flexibility in the reporting process. Auditing and setting
guidelines were two methods suggested by providers that
could help to achieve this.
CHECK reports are reviewed by CESG for quality and
metrics. Any issues found are raised with the customer
and/or the CHECK company. This is supplemented with
an annual audit where CHECK companies are requested
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to send two examples of work that best demonstrate their
technical ability. CREST reports are not audited. Two
providers (one CREST organisation) argued that “they
should be doing them.” However, without regulatory or
other external support (e.g. as with the CHECK scheme)
such an approach could see opposition from providers. In
part, because a shift in the governance framework may
require adaptations to business models, but also due to
the practical challenges of implementing this in the private
sector (e.g. handling client confidentiality).
Authoritative guidelines on reporting best practices were
suggested in the belief that if clients had access to such
guidelines, their expectations would raise the reporting
standards by providers. PTES does contain reporting stan-
dards; however, PTES has failed so far to achieve widespread
awareness amongst the buying community. The provider
community is aware of issues around reporting, and some
providers are taking steps to address this. One example
that the authors were made aware of during the study was
a community project that aims to create a baseline, min-
imum standard for reporting. The output will be a series
of guidelines outlining best practices, and an example re-
port that will be made available to the public (i.e. both
providers and clients). The example report will be pro-
duced based on the findings of a real engagement under-
taken by the project’s group. This project involves some
providers within the PTES group; however, this project
will be independent from PTES.
5.4. Summary of key findings
Several key findings on the different stages of the en-
gagement process warrant highlighting:
• Pre-engagement:
– The ambiguity of what constitutes a penetration
test was a cause of confusion and frustration
amongst stakeholders.
– Smaller providers utilise face-to-face meetings
to distinguish themselves against the “faceless”
larger providers.
– Undisclosed third party systems were a com-
mon cause of delayed testing.
– More effort needs to be made to provide guid-
ance for international engagements.
• Practical assessment:
– Many providers and clients have an aversion to
exploitation of vulnerabilities found, with the
short length of engagements a contributing fac-
tor.
– There was a diverse, and limited, use of existing
methodologies by providers, and a reluctance
to have an external methodology forced upon
them.
– Both scenario-focused and audit-based social en-
gineering were used in engagements, with scenario-
focused being most prevalent.
– The ethics around the use of social engineer-
ing was a grey area, with a range of opinions
on anonymisation, and the providers often hav-
ing to inform the clients that a request would
amount to unethical behaviour. There was a
strong call for more guidance in this area.
• Post-engagement:
– Most reports followed a similar high-level struc-
ture.
– There was a diverse use of different metrics for
scoring vulnerabilities, and a level of subjectiv-
ity, which made it difficult for clients to track
performance over time and compare results be-
tween providers.
– There was a strong objection by providers to
mandating a specific metrics system.
– There was a lack of prioritisation, categorisa-
tion, and root cause analysis of recommenda-
tions, which made it difficult for clients to un-
derstand the impact, and address systemic is-
sues.
– Clients want to see proof-of-concepts of vulner-
abilities and attack narratives, but these are
rarely provided in reports.
– Auditing and setting guidelines were suggested
as routes to improving the quality of reports.
6. Opportunities for Ecosystem Advancement
This analysis has identified a multitude of opportu-
nities for further discussion, analysis and improvement
within the simulated security assessment ecosystem, most
notably at the beginning and end of engagements. Based
on these findings seven development areas are proposed:
three which involve standardisation, and four which the in-
dustry (and wider security community) itself is in the most
suitable position to evoke change. Given the importance
(and rapid growth) of simulated security assessments, re-
solving these needs for best practice quickly would aid
providers and buyers. The seven development areas can
be seen in Figure 5, and are detailed within the following
sections. Each development area is numbered according
to the relevant engagement phase: pre-engagement (P1),
practical assessment (P2), and post-engagement (P3). Cer-
tain development areas provide contributions towards ad-
dressing the requirements of other areas; contributing re-
lationships and their directions are also illustrated within
































Figure 5: Opportunities for Improvement within the Simulated Se-
curity Assessment Ecosystem
6.1. Pre-Engagement
Providers offer a diverse mix of qualities and depth of
simulated security assessments. The buying market in the
words of one provider is in need of something to compare
“like-for-like”. Two development areas are proposed to
address this requirement.
Standardisation of terminology (P1.1) is recom-
mended to enable clients to make more informed procure-
ment decisions. The current heterogeneity of service offer-
ings creates uncertainty for clients in what will be deliv-
ered, which establishes high requirements for pre-procurement
due diligence, which is not always feasible. The form of
standardisation proposed here is not to attempt to estab-
lish wholesale consistency between providers, which would
be both infeasible to achieve and may lead to a form of
commoditisation on its own. Instead, a form of standard-
isation is proposed to establish and hold providers to a
minimum service quality for the different service defini-
tions (e.g., vulnerability assessment, penetration test, and
red team exercises), while allowing the flexibility to cus-
tomise services to meet client requirements. The PTES is
one notable community project, which is working towards
a similar goal of terminology standardisation. Standards
bodies should look towards developing relationships with
community efforts to achieve similar terminology models.
Such an approach leverages existing work by subject mat-
ter experts. Furthermore, in the opinions of providers, the
reputation of standards bodies can aid in bringing these
concepts to the mass market.
Internationalisation (P1.1.1) Stakeholders argued
that a focus on standardisation to delineate service def-
initions would aid in addressing the commoditisation of
simulated security assessments, whilst not being tied to
a specific region, and thus open to internationalisation.
From the perspective of providers, the role of terminology
standardisation in the internationalisation of simulated se-
curity assessment services was significant. Although such
a standard would be intended to have a positive impact
within the UK market, it would have wider impact within
the fledgling international markets that providers are in-
creasingly looking to for growth.
Enforcement (P1.1.2) Standards are ineffective with-
out enforcement. The manner in which such standardis-
ation is enforced requires further research and discussion.
Stakeholder opinions within this study followed two tracks.
First, having existing technical bodies place greater em-
phasis on policing service quality. However, two challenges
would need to be resolved. The first is the challenges
of practically conducting such policing; some of which
were discussed in the context of reporting in Section 5.3.
The second concerns internationalisation, and how these
standards are tied to largely region specific certifications
(e.g., CHECK is UK only, while the two implementations
of CREST, CREST UK and CREST Australia, operate
independently, with expansion also in progress to Singa-
pore). The potential for an international standard in the
traditional sense, which is enforced by national accredi-
tation bodies through certification bodies requires further
research (in this scenario existing technical bodies would
be certification bodies who then certify provider compa-
nies).
Client education (P1.2) Standardisation of termi-
nology alone, however, is not a panacea to pre-engagement
woes. Client engagement is paramount. A number of de-
velopment areas contribute to this aim, but here the call
from stakeholders was for providers to place greater em-
phasis on not only educating clients on the importance of
security, but empowering them through education to im-
prove their security posture. Such empowerment occurs
throughout the engagement life cycle: it begins with ed-
ucation on effective and appropriate service models, and
ends with education on remediation. For pre-engagement
activities, such education is largely self-completing. Ser-
vice understanding develops naturally through exposure
to services (e.g., annual assessments). However, such de-
velopment can be facilitated by providers through greater
transparency within their service models.
6.2. Practical Assessment
A strong opposition to any form of standardisation in
relation to the practical assessment phase has been dis-
cussed, along with the success, and continued improvement
of the technical bodies (e.g., CHECK and CREST) in this
domain. Despite this, two areas for potential improvement
are noteworthy.
Domain-specific methodologies (P2.1) Providers
scarcely use peer-reviewed methodologies as described in
Section 5.2.2, instead preferring a synthesis of approaches
for their internal methodology. This synthesis is signifi-
cant, as despite their lack of strict usage, public method-
ologies do guide the design of internal methodologies. In
most scenarios, such methodologies are well established
(e.g., infrastructure, web applications, and increasingly,
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mobile devices). For engagements involving niche and
novel environments, however, this is atypical. Further-
more, in such engagements providers expressed a notable
malleability in the service definitions used by some providers,
which it can be argued, may arise through the lack of
peer-reviewed knowledge on what assessments should en-
tail, along with establishing further evidence on the re-
quirement for standardisation of terminology (P1.1). The
development of domain-specific methodologies is also rec-
ommended to aid in addressing this knowledge gap. One
notable case in which this occurs is with Industrial Con-
trol Systems. Since the conclusion of this paper’s inter-
view process, CREST has begun undertaking a project to
this effect. This project is examining the need for new
and updated public methodologies, along with exploring
the possibility and form of services being expanded into
this domain (e.g., the STAR scheme as a service and as
individual qualifications).
Ethics (P2.2) One success of the industry within the
UK (notably by CREST) has been the formalised struc-
ture for dealing with complaints at the technical body
level. Included within this structure is the facility to han-
dle complaints concerning ethics. However, for this sys-
tem to function effectively, providers must have a clear
understanding of the ethical framework within which to
work under. In broad terms, providers felt the industry
has proven capable of handling this responsibility in the
majority of cases. However, a need for further research
around ethics (P2.2) was identified in multiple areas; most
notably for where simulated security assessments involve
human subjects (e.g., where social engineering is used).
In this scenario, research would also be intended to im-
prove client education (P1.2) on their responsibilities to
their employees (e.g., with respect to anonymisation, and
remediation being training-led rather than punitive). The
topic of ethics has been addressed somewhat within aca-
demic literature (see Section 2.4), e.g. for phishing exper-
iments. Further research is needed, and for the researched
methodologies to be taken up by industry.
6.3. Post-Engagement
Post-engagement comes in a variety of forms. It is
both the immediate aftermath of an engagement, and the
implications of that engagement. Here three development
areas are proposed that span both categories.
Although the high-level structure of reports was found
to be relatively standardised between providers, at a lower
level, stakeholders were found to be dissatisfied with var-
ious characteristics of reports. For providers, it was pre-
dominantly their experiences of seeing competitors offering
vulnerability assessments that had been mis-marketed and
sold as penetration tests. The most effective resolution to
this arguably comes not from a focus on the report itself,
but around the standardisation of terminology (P1.1). For
clients, it was the inconsistency between providers, and a
lack of depth in the provision of metrics and recommen-
dations (e.g. root cause analysis) to empower the client
to understand more about the security issues within their
environment.
Reporting guidelines (P3.1) A standard in the form
of a guideline, rather than a specification, for reporting is
recommended. Rigid standardisation would likely see sig-
nificant opposition; providers see their reports as a means
to differentiate themselves and add value to their offering
to the client. However, guidelines describing best prac-
tices could be produced, and have the potential to provide
an effective alternative. Through standards bodies, such
guidelines would likely gain significant exposure within
the buying community, which may be otherwise difficult
to achieve. Exposure facilitates client education (P1.2),
which empowers clients to make informed decisions when
interacting with providers, and gives them a clear concep-
tion of what they should expect. Such guidelines could
address all of the aforementioned issues within this study,
while describing best practices around the processes that
support report production (e.g. quality assurance). As
with the recommendations on terminology, standards bod-
ies should look to leverage existing efforts within the com-
munity to raise reporting standards. This should include
working with technical bodies in the UK, such as CREST,
while remaining aware that guidelines should not be region-
specific.
Metrics (P3.2) Of the characteristics of reports that
elicited dissatisfaction, one of the most prominent was that
of security metrics. To some extent the issues surround-
ing metrics can be mitigated through reporting guidelines
(P3.1) and the wider educational process for clients (P1.2).
If clients are educated and empowered to mandate metrics
and related reporting requirements, as many larger enter-
prises have done, a degree of consistency can be achieved.
Providers, however, often perceived such an approach neg-
atively (e.g., as these metrics differ highly between clients),
and furthermore, the general consensus was that providers
see unique metric approaches as a market differentiator. It
is through the metrics after all that security is measured
and understood. For clients, however, the call was for
that understanding to be facilitated by consistent mea-
surements between providers. Two factors require further
research and discussion. The first is establishing consen-
sus and backing for a consistent measurement approach. A
large part of the debate arises through providers perceiving
that there is no “good” metric. The notion of mandatory
CVSS 2.0 (supplementary to any other approach), and
hope for CVSS 3.0 was touted by a number of providers.
The second is to examine how this can be achieved while
minimising the subjectivity involved in making such judge-
ments, which is a primary source of inconsistency.
Auditing guidelines (P3.3) Looking beyond the scope
of an engagement, simulated security assessments contribute
to ISO/IEC 27001 audits under an isolated ISO/IEC 27002
security control “technical compliance review”. Audit-
ing guidelines have been produced previously in ISO/IEC
27008; however, they are being revised. Standards bodies
should look to provide auditing guideline that establish
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a clearer link between the scope of an engagement and
its findings, and ISO/IEC 27002 security controls beyond
the narrow categorisation of a technical compliance review.
Some stakeholders mentioned the perception of ISO/IEC
27001 being a “check box exercise”, and where simulated
security assessments are of relevance in the audit process,
the audit is merely a confirmation that it has occurred,
rather than a detailed analysis of its findings to determine
whether the security controls that have been implemented
are consistent with the objectives of the ISMS.
Auditing guidelines provide the opportunity to link
the socio-technical security controls of ISO/IEC 27002,
and the socio-technical nature of simulated security assess-
ments. Such assessments may only be one group of assess-
ment methodologies, but they continue to rise in popular-
ity and are increasingly seen as a regulatory requirement.
Furthermore, penetration tests and red team exercises are
arguably the most realistic methodologies currently avail-
able for simulating cyber threats. As part of this process,
it is recommended that standards bodies examine the inte-
gration of simulated security assessments with other stan-
dards, such as ISO 31000. A diverse array of metrics can be
used as part of an engagement, but what is its meaning for
risk management, and how does this impact the risk that
is to be managed as part of ISO/IEC 27001? Furthermore,
auditing guidelines maintain a close relationship with the
requirement for terminology standardisation (P1.1). If a
standard or other assurance scheme mandates a particular
variety of simulated security assessment, how can audi-
tors ensure that it has been appropriately delivered with-
out consensus establishing what such an assessment should
look like?
7. Conclusion
The CHECK and CREST schemes, along with tech-
nical bodies such as the Tigerscheme, have successfully
defined the technical capabilities of individuals who per-
form simulated security assessments, and can be seen to
be making great efforts to encourage evolution within the
industry. In addition, both CHECK and CREST have
laid the foundations for the assessment of organisational
processes that support engagements. The professionalisa-
tion of simulated security assessments that such schemes
have enabled is primarily concerned with the UK market.
The findings of this study suggest that on an international
scale, the level of professionalisation is less formalised,
with respect to both individuals and provider organisa-
tions (e.g., in terms of how evidence of competency can be
provided to employers and clients), although there are iso-
lated exceptions that were highly regarded, such as is the
case with some individual qualifications within the United
States (specifically those from Offensive Security). It can
therefore be argued that the international market can learn
many lessons from the path to professionalisation that has
been paved by the UK market. There is much evidence to
suggest that a shift towards a UK-style professionalisation
is not only possible, but desired, as can be seen through
the recommendation of UK originating schemes in non-UK
and international standards (e.g., PCI DSS [46]), and as
is evidenced by the expansion of UK originating schemes
to other countries (e.g., CREST Australia).
Despite the professionalisation, this study has identi-
fied that there remains a number of issues at the start
and end of the engagement process that the industry has
currently failed to address. This is not through a lack of
awareness of these issues; this study has highlighted that
both providers and clients are dissatisfied by the lack of
transparency and consistency in industry offerings. It is
based on these findings that the authors make the pro-
posal: standardisation is needed.
Standards must be well formed to avoid the potential
to suffocate and hinder rapidly evolving industries, such
as the one we find with simulated security assessments.
Self-regulation in such an environment is an ideal solution
(e.g., through trade organisation’s auditing services deliv-
ered as opposed to static document reviews of methodolo-
gies); however, as one provider stated, when it comes to
current industry offerings, it can be a “Wild West”. This
is not due to a lack of technical capability within the indus-
try, as the technological bar has been set and maintained
by the technical bodies. One provider argued that the
“UK security industry can provide anything the market
asks for”; the problem is that “it [the market] does not ask
the right questions”, which promotes ambiguity when in-
terpreting service model requirements and results in a lack
of demand for robust governance structures. The frame-
work for future improvement proposed here is intended
to work towards remediating industry issues, using a col-
laborative approach of standardisation and industry-led
development.
The form of standardisation proposed within these rec-
ommendations must be shaped through continued discus-
sion with all stakeholders. As such, the findings of this
paper have led to a preliminary workshop in July 2015
which was hosted by BSI to determine the consensus be-
tween stakeholders in the UK. Despite the vocal findings
on the need for standards from many stakeholders the feed-
back from the workshop was that the two key stakeholder
groups for the UK (CESG and CREST) would need to be
explicitly on board for this to proceed as a national stan-
dard. The potential for ISO/IEC standardisation is also
being explored.
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